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THE MARIJUANA PROHIBITION IN
MISSOURI UNSUCCESSFUL
State v. Mitchell1
Jerry Mitchell was charged with the sale of marijuana, the underlying
offense being the sale of approximately eleven grams of marijuana for five
dollars. The Missouri regulatory statute2 prescribes a penalty of imprison-
ment from five years to life in a state correctional institution for the
delivery of marijuana for remuneration. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Mit-
chell entered a guilty plea, and a second charge for the sale of a larger
quantity of marijuana, which Mitchell admitted, was dismissed. After a
presentence investigation, the trial court sentenced Mitchell to a term of
twelve years in the state penitentiary. A motion was then filed to withdraw
the guilty plea. At a subsequent hearing, this motion was withdrawn and
the trial court reduced the sentence to seven years. Mitchell directly ap-
pealed to the Missouri Supreme Court contending that the classification of
marijuana in the Missouri statute denies equal protection of the laws in
violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
and that the punishments prescribed for offenses involving the sale of
marijuana constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 3 The Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed the seven year sentence. 4
Since the early 1930's when marijuana was defined as a narcotic in the
Uniform Narcotic Drug Act' there have been numerous constitutional
challenges to the drug's prohibition.6 From 1930 until the mid-1960's,
1. 563 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
2. RSMo § 195.200 (Supp. 1975).
3. 563 S.W.2d at 21.
4. Since the Missouri Supreme Court's affirmation of the trial court's deci-
sion in this case, the Governor of Missouri on July 20, 1978, refused to grant Mit-
chell's request for a pardon. Mitchell recently filed a petition seeking a writ of
habeas corpus. Mitchell v. Blackwell, Sup't, Intermediate Reformatory for Men,
No. 78-0728-CV-W-2 (W.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 1978).
5. See 1932 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONF. OF COMM. ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 95-107. For a review of the history of marijuana
in the United States, see Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the
Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of the American Mari-
juana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971 (1970).
6. Soler, Of Cannabis and the Courts: A Critical Examination of Constitu-
tional Challenges to Statutory Marijuana Prohibitions, 6 CONN. L. REv. 601, 601
(1974).
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courts generally dismissed such arguments summarily. 7 Consequently,
during this period of time persons seeking to overturn their convictions for
possession or sale of marijuana were limited to raising procedural objec-
tions and evidentiary matters on appeal." In the last decade, however, as
the use of the drug has become more widespread and as public debate con-
cerning its harmfulness has increased, constitutional attacks have begun to
receive serious consideration by many courts. The primary constitutional
claims that have been asserted in this area 9 are the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws'0 and the eighth amendment's guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment. "
The equal protection challenge focuses on the arbitrariness of the
classification of marijuana in a regulatory statute. While some states
classify controlled substances by definition or penalization, 12 a large
number of state statutes, modeled after the federal comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 13 classify them by description.14 Such a
classification-by-description statute specifies each class of drugs, not by
chemical or physical properties, but rather by "declarative statements
which purport to convey social, political, medical, or scientific attitudes
towards the members of the class."u s The Missouri statute 6 is of this type,
as evidenced by the statute's highest category, Schedule I, which embraces
all substances (1) which have a high potential for abuse and (2) which have
no accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or lack accepted
safety for use in treatment under medical supervision.' 7 Marijuana is
classified in this category along with heroin and opiates.18 On the other
7. Bonnie & Whitebread, supra note 5, at 1083.
8. Id.
9. Various constitutional claims have been raised in these recent cases, in-
cluding the right to privacy, Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975), noted in
Note, Marijuana Prohibition and the Constitutional Right of Privacy: An Ex-
amination of Ravin v. State, 11 TULSA L.J. 563 (1976); the right of the free exer-
cise of religion, People v. Mitchell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 884(1966); State ex rel. Scott v. Conaty, 155 W. Va. 718, 187 S.E.2d 119 (1972); and
the freedom of expression, Borras v. State, 229 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 808 (1970).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
12. See Soler, supra note 6, at 624-25.
13. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
14. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 204.203 (1977); KAN. STAT. § 65-4104 (1972).
But see Cannabis Control Act of 1971, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56]6, §§ 701-19
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (statute solely proscribing marijuana).
15. Soler, supra note 6, at 625.
16. RSMo § 195.017 (Supp. 1975).
17. RSMo § 195.017.1 (Supp. 1975). Almost all of the state regulatory
statutes which classify drugs by description employ, verbatim, these same criteria
in their highest category. See IOWA CODE § 204.203 (1977); KAN. STAT. § 65-
4104 (1972); KY. REV. STAT. § 218A.040 (1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,§ 2-203 (West 1973).
18. RSMo § 195.017.2(4)0) (Supp. 1975).
1979] 115
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hand, Schedule III of the Missouri statute 9 includes barbiturates, the il-
legal sale of which carries a comparatively lighter penalty. 20
Defendants charged with conduct involving marijuana (possession or
sale) have asserted that there is "no rational basis"21 for this statutory
classification of marijuana with so-called "hard drugs" such as heroin, co-
caine and opium, while other substances more dangerous than marijuana,
such as barbiturates, are classified in a lower category, or like alcohol and
nicotine, 22 are not classified at all. 23 In an effort to prove that the substan-
tive qualities of marijuana do not fit the descriptive criteria of the regula-
tory statute, defendants in jurisdictions with classification schemes similar
to that employed in Missouri have endeavored to introduce into evidence
the findings of recent scientific studies24 concerning the drug's psycholog-
ical and physiological effects. 25 Few courts have given full consideration to
such evidence even though the United States Supreme Court has said that
current factual data can26 be used to determine the validity of statutory
19. RSMo § 195.017.6(3)(a) (Supp. 1975).
20. From 2-10 years. RSMo § 195.270 (Supp. 1975).
21. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533
(1973).
22. For a discussion of the relative dangers of marijuana, alcohol and
nicotine, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARI-
HUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972) [hereinafter cited as NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA]; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, MARIHUANA AND HEALTH IN PERSPEC-
TIVE, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS FROM THE
SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (1975) [hereinafter cited as
FIFTH HEW REPORT].
23. E.g., State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 370 A.2d 1310, 1312 (1976); People
v. McCabe, 49 111. 2d 338, 341, 275 N.E.2d 407, 409 (1971); People v. Demers, 42
App. Div. 2d 634, 634, 345 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (1973). See State v. Wadsworth,
109 Ariz. 59, 63, 505 P.2d 230, 234 (1973) (reasonable basis test used); People v.
Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 66, 400 P.2d 923, 927 (1965) (reasonable relation test used).
24. CANADIAN COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE NON-MEDICAL USE OF
DRUGS, CANNABIS (1972) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN' COMMISSION]; NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA, supra note 22.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 353 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973) (classification not arbitrary or irrational); United
States v. Maiden, 355 F. Supp. 743, 748 (D. Conn. 1973) (motion to dismiss in-
dictment denied); English v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 714, 717 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(classification violated equal protection clause), rev'd sub nom., English v.
Virginia Prob. & Parole Bd., 481 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1973); People v. McCabe, 49
Ill. 2d 338, 342, 275 N.E.2d 407, 410 (1971) (classification violated equal protec-
tion clause); State v. Leppanen, 252 Or. 352, 353, 449 P.2d 447, 447 (1969) (con-
viction upheld); State v. Zornes, 78 Wash. 2d 9, 15-19, 469 P.2d 552, 558-59
(1970) (classification of marijuana as a narcotic is improper).
26. The following dictum from the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Goesaert v. Cleary should be noted: "The Constitution does not require legisla-
tion to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it
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classifications. 2 1 Most courts simply have upheld challenged marijuana
statutes by invoking the presumption of constitutionality with which all
legislation is clothed. 28
However, some courts have scrutinized the relevant medical, scientific
and sociological data concerning the effects of marijuana. 29 The Illinois
Supreme Court closely examined such data in People v. McCabe.30 In
deciding whether a rational basis existed for the classification of marijuana
in the Illinois regulatory statute with narcotic drugs such as heroin and co-
caine, the McCabe court meticulously assessed the "voluminous materials"
presented as evidence by both the appellant and the respondent, 31 and
found that, unlike narcotic drugs, marijuana is not addictive, 32 and that
its use does not entail a powerful "compulsion to abuse"3 3 or "singularly or
extraordinarily" cause violent or aggressive behavior 34 or lead to heroin
use.35 Based on these considerations, the court concluded that the classifi-
27. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 53 (1969); Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1905).
28. See, e.g., Boswell v. State, 290 Ala. 349, 276 So. 2d 592 (1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1118 (1974); State v. Wadsworth, 109 Ariz. 59, 505 P.2d 230
(1973); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965); People v. Demers, 42
App. Div. 2d 634, 345 N.Y.S.2d 184 (1973); State v. Leppanen, 252 Or. 352, 449
P.2d 447 (1969).
29. See State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 370 A.2d 1310 (1976) (conviction
upheld); People v. McCabe, 49 Ill. 2d 338, 341-49, 275 N.E.2d 407, 411-13
(1971) (conviction reversed); People v. Sinclair, 387 Mich. 91, 104-12, 194
N.W.2d 878, 881-86 (1972) (conviction reversed primarily on equal protection
grounds); State v. Carus, 118 N.J. Super. 159, 161, 286 A.2d 740, 741 (1972)
(complaint dismissed); Sam v. State, 500 P.2d 291, 297 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972)
(conviction reversed). A Florida circuit court, relying primarily on expert testi-
mony, has recently held that the classification of marijuana in that state's drug
abuse control statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.03(1)(c)(10) (West Supp. 1978), is
unconstitutional. State v. Leigh, No. 72-267 (Fla. Supp. 1978).
30. 49 Ill. 2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971). McCabe involved an equal pro-
tection challenge to the Illinois Narcotic Drug Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 22-1 to 22-49.1 (repealed 1971), by a defendant sentenced to the mandatory
minimum penalty of ten years in prison for a first conviction of selling marijuana.
McCabe specifically contended that the more severe punishment for the offense
under the narcotics statute as opposed to the lesser punishment for the sale of
stimulant and depressant drugs under the Illinois Drug Abuse Control Act, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111 V, §§ 801-12 (repealed 1971), violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 49 Ill. 2d at 340, 275 N.E.2d at 408-09.
Stimulant and depressant drugs as well as narcotic drugs are now classified in
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act of 1971, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 561 ,
§§ 1100 et seq. (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). Marijuana is proscribed separately in
the Cannabis Control Act of 1971, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 561 , §§ 701-18 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1978).
31. 49 Ill. 2d at 341, 275 N.E.2d at 409.
32. Id. at 345, 275 N.E.2d at 411.
33. Id. at 347, 275 N.E.2d at 412.
34. Id. at 349, 275 N.E.2d at 413.
35. Id. at 348-49, 275 N.E.2d at 412-13.
1979]
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cation of marijuana in the Illinois statute violated the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 6
Like the defendant in McCabe, the appellant in Mitchell3 7 introduced
the results of several comprehensive research studies38 in order to demon-
strate that marijuana does not have a high potential for abuse. 39 Two of
these studies, one by the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug
Abuse and the other by the Canadian Commission of Inquiry Into the
Non-Medical Use of Drugs, reported findings that marijuana is not addic-
tive, 40 that it does not cause violent or criminal behavior, 41 and that it
poses no danger of death from overdose. 42 Additionally, in an effort to
demonstrate that marijuana does not fit the second criterion for sub-
stances included in Schedule I of the Missouri regulatory statute,43 the ap-
pellant in Mitchell provided evidence that marijuana has been used in the
United States as an anti-emetic for cancer patients receiving chemo-
therapy, and as an effective medication in the treatment of disorders such
as glaucoma 44 and asthma.45 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, did
36. Id. at 350, 275 N.E.2d at 413. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed Mc-
Cabe's conviction.
37. The majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court in Mitchell
pointed out that McCabe is a distinguishable precedent from the situation involv-
ingJerry Mitchell in that, in Illinois, marijuana was classified with narcotic drugs
and not with hallucinogenic drugs, while in Missouri marijuana is classified in
Schedule I with hallucinogenic drugs. 563 S.W.2d at 24-25.
38. The studies presented by the appellant in Mitchell included the follow-
ing: CANADIAN COMMISSION, supra note 24; DOMESTIC COUNCIL DRUG-ABUSE
TASK FORCE, "WHITE PAPER ON DRUG ABUSE" (1975); FIFTH HEW REPORT,
supra note 22; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA, supra note 22; NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, DRUG ABUSE IN
AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE (1973); V. RUBIN & L. COMITAS, GANJA IN
JAMAICA (1975); MENDLESON, BEHAVIORAL AND BIOLOGICAL CONCOMITANTS
OF CHRONIC MARIJUANA USE (UNITED STATES ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT COMMAND) (1974).
39. Brief for Appellant at 11-17.
40. CANADIAN COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 123; NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON MARIHUANA, supra note 22, at 87.
41. CANADIAN COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 110; NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON MARIHUANA, supra note 22, at 73.
42. CANADIAN COMMISSION, supra note 24, at 113-14; NATIONAL COMMIS-
SION ON MARIHUANA, supra note 22, at 56-57.
43. A substance is placed in Schedule I if it is found that the substance: "(1)
has high potential for abuse; and (2) has no accepted medical use in treatment in
the United States or lacks accepted safety for use in treatment under medical
supervision." RSMo § 195.017 (Supp. 1975).
44. The New Mexico legislature has enacted a statute which permits a citi-
zen to use marijuana for certain medical needs such as treating glaucoma and
also counteracting the nausea attendant upon chemotherapy. Controlled
Substance Therapeutic Research Act, House Bill 329, 33rd Legislature, Signed
by the Governor, February 21, 1978.
45. Brief for Appellant at 24-25. Marijuana has also been used in the treat-
ment of leukemia, high blood pressure and anorexia nervosa. See Soler, supra
[Vol. 44
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not address the question of accepted medical use in treatment, even
though the evidence would seem to support appellant's contention of mis-
classification; nor did it squarely face the conclusions of the government-
financed studies which the appellant presented in order to show that
marijuana does not have a high potential for abuse. The court merely
acknowledged appellant's data and, without specifying the authorities to
which it was referring, stated: "[T]here are, however, other authorities
which take a contrary view regarding the hazards involved in using mari-
juana.146 This statement sheds little light on the basis for the court's
reasoning. The court then relied on a United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, United States v. Carolene Products Co. ,4 in support of the proposi-
tion that where legislation is based upon questions of fact that are unset-
tled, a court must sustain that legislation until the invalidity of the
premises on which the statute rests is no longer contested. 48 Accordingly,
since the harmlessness of marijuana is, in the court's opinion, a debatable
medical issue, the court could find no basis for concluding that the classifi-
cation of the substance in Schedule I of section 195.017 is arbitrary or
irrational.
In light of the court's application of the Carolene Products test in Mit-
chell, it appears that equal protection arguments in this area will fail as
long as the Missouri Supreme Court contends that marijuana use may be
harmful. Solid and irrefutable proof of marijuana's benign nature appar-
ently will be required before the court will alter its position. The Mitchell
court, however, provided little guidance for future defendants as to what
note 6, at 633. The alleged therapeutic values of marijuana were virtually
unknown until relatively recent years. Mitchell is one of the first cases to consider
such evidence.
46. 563 S.W.2d at 26. In its brief, however, the State of Missouri did cite one
authority describing adverse qualities of marijuana, G. NAHAS, KEEP OFF THE
GRAsSl, A SCIENTIST'S DOCUMENTED ACCOUNT OF MARIJUANA'S DESTRUCTIVE
EFFECTS (1976). Brief for Respondent at 13. Other studies to which the Missouri
Supreme Court might have referred include: Kolansky & Moore, Effects of Mari-
juana on Adolescents and Young Adults, 216 J.A.M.A. 486 (1971); Kolansky &
Moore, Marjuana: Can It Hurt You?, 232 J.A.M.A. 923 (1974); Talbott &
Teague, Marijuana Psychosis, 210 J.A.M.A. 299 (1969).
47. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Connecticut Supreme Court also applied
Carolene Products recently in a marijuana case. State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 370
A.2d 1310, 1314 (1976) (upholding the Connecticut marijuana regulatory
statute).
48. 563 S.W.2d at 26. Judge Seiler in his dissenting opinion in Mitchell,
however, pointed out that Carolene Products, which upheld the constitutionality
of the Filled Milk Act of 1923, is a distinguishable precedent from the instant
case. Id. at 29 (Seiler, J., dissenting). Judge Seiler directed the court's attention to
the footnote in Carolene Products in whichJustice Stone stated: "There may be a
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legis-
lation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
1979] 119
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constitutes conclusive proof in that regard. The majority opinion never
challenged the reliability of appellant's data or pointed out why it was in-
adequate. The court also chose not to cite authorities contrary to
Mitchell's position. Until the Missouri Supreme Court confronts this issue
of conclusive proof, the prospects for a successful equal protection attack
on the marijuana regulatory statute appear bleak.
The other primary constitutional challenge in this area is the eighth
amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Unlike
equal protection which contests the statutory classification scheme, an
assertion of cruel and unusual punishment challenges the length of sen-
tence49 or type of penalty prescribed by statute as punishment for certain
conduct. The leading case on the subject is Weems v. United States,5 0 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a Phillipine statute
authorizing a minimum sentence of twelve years at hard labor for falsify-
ing government documents constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The statute violated the eighth amendment prohibition not only because
of the method of punishment it prescribed but also because of the dispro-
portionality of the sentence to the severity of the offense.51 Since Weems,
the Supreme Court has made numerous attempts to formulate a definitive
standard for determining which punishments are. excessive under the
eighth amendment.5 2 However, a universally applicable test has never
been developed.53 Many courts consequently have been reluctant to con-
sider cruel and unusual punishment challenges as long as the penalty im-
posed is within the guidelines authorized by statute.54
In a recent effort to refine such an eighth amendment test, the United
States Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgiass stated that "a punishment is
'excessive' and unconstitutional if it (1) makes no measurable contribution
to acceptable goals of punishment56 and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly
49. Early opinions construed this prohibition as a ban only against physical
torture and barbarous methods of punishment. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 337 (1892); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446-47 (1890); Wilkerson v.
Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
50. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
51. Id. at 368.
52. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Greggv. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
53. See Soler, supra note 6, at 677.
54. See, e.g., Page v. United States, 462 F.2d 932, 935 (3d Cir. 1972);
United States v. Shunk, 438 F.2d 1204, 1205 (9th Cir. 1971); Note, The Effective-
ness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846, 852 (1967).
55. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
56. Isolation, rehabilitation, deterrence, etc.
[Vol. 44
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out of proportion to the severity of the crime."5 7 The Supreme Court in
Coker went on to advise future courts to employ objective criteria as much
as possible when determining whether the above standard has been met.58
To ensure adequate objectivity, several such criteria were suggested: com-
parison of current state statutes concerning punishment for the offense,
historical comparison of such statutes,5 9 and contemporary jury deter-
minations.6 0 These factors, however, have not been consistently employed
by subsequent courts. 6 '
In Mitchell, it was asserted that the penalty in Missouri for the sale of
marijuana constituted cruel and unusual punishment both on the face of
the statute and as applied to the appellant. In the latter argument, for
which there is authority in only a few jurisdictions, 62 the appellant con-
tended that the seven year sentence was not justified due to his specific cir-
cumstances: he was nineteen years old, he had no history of violent crime,
and he had plead guilty to selling only a small amount of marijuana to an
adult. 63 The Missouri Supreme Court summarily dismissed this argu-
ment.6 4 The court instead was primarily concerned with the former con-
tention that there is no rational relationship between the punishment
under section 195.200 for the sale of marijuana (five years to life imprison-
ment) and the gravity of the offense. However, rather than analyzing ob-
jective factors "to the maximum possible extent" as Coker mandated, 65 the
court, in considering the eighth amendment challenge, chose to follow a
Missouri appellate decision, State v. Johnson,66 which employed a subjec-
tive approach: "[A] punishment which is within the statutory limits for the
offense . . . is not cruel and unusual because of its duration unless so
disproportionate to the offense committed so as to shock the moral sense of
all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the circum-
57. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). It should be noted that although Coker was
specifically concerned with different circumstances than Mitchell- capital
punishment rather than length of prison sentence- the United States Supreme
Court has applied the disproportionality concept in a few eighth amendment
cases involving excessive sentence. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
58. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
59. Application of this factor is illustrated by Coker, where it was employed
to point out that at no time in the last fifty years have a majority of the states
authorized capital punishment for the rape of an adult women.
60. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d479 (Ala. 1977); Bakri v. State, 551
S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1977); Upshaw v. State, 350 So. 2d 1358 (Miss. 1977); State v.
Mitchell, 563 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
62. See, e.g., Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1975); In re Lynch, 8
Cal..3d 410, 425, 503 P.2d 921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (1972).
63. Brief for Appellant at 37-38.
64. 563 S.W.2d at 27.
65. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
66. 548 S.W.2d 245 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
1979]
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stances."6 The court held that the penalty of from five years to life did not
meet this standard, and thereby sustained section 195.200.
Believing that the application ofJohnson would result in the compro-
mising of all eighth amendment challenges in Missouri,6 8 Judge Seiler in
his dissenting opinion in Mitchell suggested a different approach. He pro-
posed that four factors be considered in determining whether a sentence is
excessive: "(a) reliable factual data, (b) relevant informed public opinion,
(c) the sanction imposed in other jurisdictions, and (d) the penalties in
Missouri for other crimes."6 9 Injudge Seiler's opinion, when these factors70
are applied to conduct involving marijuana, a minimum sentence of five
years must constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
71
Judge Seiler's first proposed factor, reliable factual data, essentially in-
volves the same proof as that called for in an equal protection challenge.
Under this criterion, a defendant charged with the sale of marijuana could
supply such reliable factual data by presenting the findings extracted from
the government-financed studies referred to earlier 72 which demonstrate
that the substance does not have a high potential for abuse. The second
factor, relevant informed public opinion, seemingly is an attempt to fulfill
the suggestion in Coker that an assessment of contemporary values and at-
titudes towards the specific offense is pertinent to an evaluation of a cruel
and unusual punishment argument. In Coker, an analysis of jury deter-
minations in similar cases was deemed to meet this goal. 73 Judge Seiler, on
the other hand, cited the opinions of numerous reputable organizations,
such as the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association,
and the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar, favoring the decriminali-
zation of marijuana. 74 Both the third factor (the sanction imposed in other
jurisdictions) and the fourth factor (penalties in Missouri for other crimes)
closely follow the suggestion in Coker that the judgment of the legislature
be considered as an objective criterion. 75 The third proposed factor would
67. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
68. 563 S.W.2d at 28 n.1 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 30.
70. A fifth factor, the availability of parole, perhaps should also be con-
sidered by a court. If a defendant will be eligible for parole from the day he enters
prison, as he is in Missouri, the likelihood that he will be freed before serving the
minimum statutory sentence may mitigate somewhat the harshness of the penal-
ty. But see People v. Gonzales, 25 Ill. 2d 235, 240, 184 N.E.2d 833, 835-36
(1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 923 (1963), in which the Illinois Supreme Court
said that regardless of the possibility of parole, a minimum sentence of ten years
for a first offense involving the sale of marijuana was too severe. Id. at 240, 184
N.E.2d at 835-36.
71. 563 S.W.2d at 31 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
72. See authorities cited note 40 supra.
'73. 433 U.S. 584, 596-97 (1977).
74. 563 S.W.2d at 30-31 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
75. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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compare76 the challenged penalty to the punishments prescribed for the
same offense in other jurisdictions. Such a comparison applied to the in-
stant case reveals that forty-nine jurisdictions77 authorize a lesser
minimum 78 penalty than does Missouri for a first offense of selling less than
one-half ounce of marijuana. 79 Only in the State of Virginia is the
minimum penalty8" for such an offense as severe as it is in Missouri. judge
Seiler's fourth factor would compare the penalty in question with that
given in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses. For example, in
Missouri the minimum sentence of five years for the delivery of marijuana
for remuneration is the same as that prescribed in the new Criminal Codes '
for such heinous offenses as assault in the first degree committed without a
deadly weapon or dangerous instrumentality,8 2 robbery in the second
degree, 83 rape without physical injury or the display of a deadly weapon in
a threatening manner,8 4 and arson in the first degree.8 5 Furthermore, in
Missouri, the minimum penalty for the offense of manslaughter is a mere
two years imprisonment or six months in jail.86
As a result of its objectivity and its feasibility of application, Judge
Seiler's eighth amendment test presents a viable approach for evaluating
the excessiveness of sentences. In light of the test's reliance on primarily
objective indicia, it, unlike the Johnson standard used by the majority in
Mitchell, adheres closely to the United States Supreme Court's reasoning
in Coker. At the same time, the Seiler test would appear to be a relatively
straightforward standard to apply. A potential weakness in this test is the
use of relevant informed public opinion as one of the factors. Even under
76. It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
the Constitution does not require that sentences meet a comparative test.
Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 586 (1959).
77. See, e.g., Cannabis Control Act of 1971, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56;4,
§ 705(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (1-3 years); IOWA CODE § 204.401(1)(b) (1977)
(0-5 years); KAN. STAT. § 65-4127(a) (Supp. 1977) (1-10 years); KY. REV. STAT.
§ 218A.990(4) (1977) (0-1 year); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17A, § 1103(2)(C) (Supp.
1977) (0-1 year and/or $1000); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-42-7 (Supp.
1977) (0-1 year and/or $1000).
78. The California Supreme Court, however, has compared maximum sen-
tences. See In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 436, 503 P.2d 921, 938-39, 105 Cal. Rptr.
217, 234-35 (1972).
79. 563 S.W.2d at 31 (Seiler, J., dissenting).
80. VA. CODE§ 18.2-248 (Supp. 1977).
81. V.A.M.S. §§ 556.011-577.100 (Supp. 1978) (effectiveJanuary 1, 1979).
82. V.A.M.S. § 565.050.2 (Supp. 1978). Under the current statute, the
penalty is 6 months in jail or 0-5 years in prison. RSMo § 559.190 (1969).
83. V.A.M.S. § 569.030.2 (Supp. 1978). Under the current statute, the
penalty is 3-5 years imprisonment. RSMo § 560.135 (1969).
84. V.A.M.S. § 566.030.2 (Supp. 1978).
85. V.A.M.S. § 569.040.2 (Supp. 1978). Under the current statute, the
penalty is 2-5 years imprisonment. RSMo § 560.025 (1969).
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